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Aviation is a complicated transportation system, and safety is of paramount importance because aircraft failure often involves
casualties. Prevention is clearly the best strategy for aviation transportation safety. Learning from past incident data to prevent
potential accidents from happening has proved to be a successful approach. To prevent potential safety hazards and make eﬀective
prevention plans, aviation safety experts identify primary and contributing factors from incident reports. However, safety experts’
review processes have become prohibitively expensive nowadays. The number of incident reports is increasing rapidly due to the
acceleration of advances in information technologies and the growth of the commercial and private aviation transportation
industries. Consequently, advanced text mining algorithms should be applied to help aviation safety experts facilitate the process
of incident data extraction. This paper focuses on constructing deep-learning-based models to identify causal factors from
incident reports. First, we prepare the data sets used for training, validation, and testing with approximately 200,000 qualiﬁed
incident reports from the Aviation Safety Reporting System (ASRS). Then, we take an open-source natural language model, which
is well trained with a large corpus of Wikipedia texts, as the baseline and ﬁne-tune it with the texts in incident reports to make it
more suited to our speciﬁc research task. Finally, we build and train an attention-based long short-term memory (LSTM) model to
identify primary and contributing factors in each incident report. The solution we propose has multilabel capability and is
automated and customizable, and it is more accurate and adaptable than traditional machine learning methods in extant research.
This novel application of deep learning algorithms to the incident reporting system can eﬃciently improve aviation safety.

1. Introduction
In the last two decades, we have witnessed rapidly evolving
customer expectations and paradigmatic business mergers
and acquisitions in the mushrooming development of the
aviation industry. In this highly competitive environment,
airline companies have increasingly exploited information
technologies to turn challenges into business opportunities
and support decision-making. Automated decision support
technologies remain one of the main challenges in air
transportation [1]. Aviation incident reporting and investigation systems are a crucial part of the ongoing digitization of safety eﬀorts. Incidents are anything abnormal

that aﬀects or could aﬀect the safety of aviation operations
[2]. Unlike accidents, which usually involve fatalities or
serious injuries, incidents are much more frequent and less
costly than accidents. They are a valuable source of data to
help identify potential hazards. Incident reports record
various abnormal events and provide reference data to the
Federal Aviation Administration, the National Aeronautics
and Space Administration, and the National Transportation
Safety Board, during the processes of decision-making,
procedure design, threat identiﬁcation, training, and so
forth [3]. Since aviation transportation is a highly sophisticated system, many factors, such as human error, aircraft
mechanical failure, extreme weather, and unreasonable
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company policy, or a combination of them, can result in
incidents. Due to the paramount value of incident data,
countries and multinational institutes have devoted signiﬁcant eﬀorts to collecting and storing incident reports for
analytical decision-making.
The Aviation Safety Reporting System (ASRS), jointly
operated by the FAA and NASA, is one of the leading
aviation incident reporting systems and is used extensively
in North America. The system receives aviation incident
reports submitted by airports, airline companies, pilots, and
crews daily. Then the system analyzes and responds to incident reports to identify potential hazards early and prevent
aviation accidents. Incident reporting and investigation
systems are critical components of safety management in
aviation transportation [4]. The information frequently
encountered in incident investigations includes the events
leading up to the accident, the factors that increased risk, the
detection of problems, and the attempts to resolve the
problems, all of which can be provided by individuals involved in incidents [5]. The ASRS, a rich and reliable database of information on aviation incidents, is used by NASA
and the FAA to evaluate the eﬀectiveness of risk management actions. As a distinctive contribution to safety management, the feedback from incident reporting systems is a
vital early-warning tool for decision-makers and planners
tasked with improving safety margins in the face of doubled
or quadrupled operations [4].
Most of the incident reports are submitted to the ASRS
voluntarily. A reporter involved in an incident can ﬁll out an
ASRS reporting form anonymously. The narrative is the
most informative part of an incident report. The reporter
recounts the actual events before, during, and after the
incident. Narrative texts mostly describe mechanical failures, observations, behaviors, and weather conditions related to the incident. All submitted ASRS reports are
currently manually analyzed and assigned at least one out of
sixteen primary factors and no more than four out of sixteen
contributing factors by experienced aviation safety analysts
[6]. The identiﬁcation of the primary and contributing
factors is a crucial step. The tabular data collected from the
reporter includes 96 tabular attributes, such as the reporter’s
role, qualiﬁcations, and experience, type of aircraft involved,
type of operator, cabin activity, weather, and many other
event-speciﬁc details. Unfortunately, based on a random
selection of 10,000 incident reports, more than 50% of the
incident reports are missing at least half of these attributes,
and most of the attributes that are often present, such as
date, local time, and state, seem to have little relevance to the
causes of the incidents. Thus, the current predicament is that
each incident report’s narrative text data is the only reliable
and informative source to identify the incident-causing
factors. Table 1 is an example of a typical ASRS incident
report and the conclusions made by human experts (Tables 1
and 2 ).
The analysis of incident causal factors in the incident
reports has been helpful in investigating the root causes of
aviation incidents. The research conducted in [7] studied
design-induced problems in Flight Management Systems
(FMSs) by selecting 99 incident reports related to FMSs
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from the ASRS. It concluded that a signiﬁcant number of
operational and design-induced problems exist in FMSs,
because the user interface of FMSs is not optimally
designed. Manufacturers should ﬁnd a better balance in
FMS design between logic and ease of use to reduce the
occurrence of errors. Another study [8] used 37 incident
reports from the National Transportation Safety Board
(NTSB) database to study errors in decision-making in the
aviation domain and discussed the nature of such errors,
what main factors contribute to them, and what solutions
might mitigate them. Reference [9] analyzed the causal
factors in aviation maintenance by investigating 3,783
ASRS incident reports related to maintenance incidents. It
concluded that individual-related and management-related
factors are the most frequent reasons for maintenance
error. The nonmaintenance perspective should be given
more attention because it can provide abundant information that is usually not included in maintenance personnel reports. To study the multifactor and single-factor
eﬀects on human performance in Air Traﬃc Management
(ATM), [10] used over 400 European aviation incident
reports related to ATM as their source data. The research
concluded that research focusing on single-factor (stress,
fatigue, communication, etc.) eﬀects on human performance is poorly suited to the complexities of contemporary
ATM, because incident reports often indicated multifactor
cooccurrences. In sum, a collection of aviation safety research and analysis has relied on incident reports and their
conclusions about causal factors. At present, the ASRS
heavily depends on human experts to identify the causal
factors. However, the increasing number of incident reports submitted every day, due to the rapid growth of the
aviation industry, has caused analysis of the newly generated incident reports to be delayed by three to six months.
This delay reduces the eﬀectiveness of the ASRS as an earlywarning system for decision-makers, aviation organizations, and government agencies.
The situation described above has become increasingly
urgent in recent years due to the burgeoning growth of
commercial air transportation, private aircraft, and unmanned aircraft systems in the aviation industry [1], thereby
yielding a quickly mounting number of incident reports.
Figure 1 shows annual incident reports ASRS received over
the last 28 years. For instance, ASRS only received approximately 4,600 incident reports in 1981, compared with
about 108,000 incident reports per month in 2019. Worse
yet, the lack of timely and accurate analysis of the incident
reports substantially reduces the value of the data, making
eﬀective safety prevention and improvement strategies increasingly challenging (Figure 1).
Safety in aviation transportation is crucial. Analyzing
incident reports quickly and accurately on a large scale
facilitates the decision-making process and makes early
detection and prevention of potential hazards possible. In
this study, we build a deep-learning model that can identify
not only primary factors but also contributing factors with
promising results described later on. The main contributions
of our research to reduce gaps in extant research are
summarized as follows:
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Table 1: The example of an incident report and its analysis results.
Incident report submitted:
Narrative: busy session numerous over ﬂights requiring course changes to avoid traﬃc. Six or seven arrivals to diﬀerent airports descending
through over ﬂights and several departures. A satellite propeller arrival was coming in from the north at 10000 and an over ﬂight was oﬀ the
departure end NE bound at 11000 two F16 south departed routed north climbing to 15000 a military intercept was squawking 7777. I
assumed this was in error and I informed the lead. I turned the aircraft to 020 heading to split the other traﬃc and allow the climb to
continue. I consciously thought about re-assigning the altitude but after the squawking the turn and traﬃc issuance, I did not want to throw
any more numbers at the pilot who would increase the transmissions and potential confusion. I wanted to get this guy on course and oﬀ my
frequency but had to wait until he topped. The guy at 10000 made numerous other transmissions. Then looked at the F16 south and he was
climbing very fast as I was about to transmit the F16 south showed 16000 and asked intermediate ﬁx. They were cleared to the block. I said
no, assigned altitude 15000, contact ZKC. No traﬃc observed, but at 560 knots aircraft can mess things up pretty quick.
Tabular data:
Time:
200905
⎪
⎧
⎪
⎪
⎪
Local
Time
of
Day:
1201 − 1800
⎪
⎪
⎪
⎨ Relative Position:
(missing)
96 attributes⎪
⋮
⎪
⎪
⎪
⎪
⋮
⎪
⎪
⎩
Cabin Light:
(missing)
Results analyzed by human experts:
Primary Factor: human factors
Contributing Factors: human factors, procedure, aircraft
Synopsis: arbus ﬂight crew landing on runway 8L at ATL reports a runway incursion after being instructed to taxi via delta; bravo; Victor;
Foxtrot to the ramp. Crew failed to turn on to bravo and entered 8R at delta. An EMB170 crew had to reject their takeoﬀ on runway 8R.
Originally, an incident report comprises two components, Narrative and Tabular data. In most cases, Tabular data is neither reliable nor useful because it is
either missing or not quite related to the incident. After being reviewed by human experts, Primary Factor, Contributing Factors, and Synopsis are the
conclusions generated from this incident.

Table 2: A comparison of our study with extant research related to aviation reporting system.
Studies
Tiller et al.
[14]
Tanguy
et al. [2]

Kuhn [15]

Robinson
[13]
Shi et al. [4]

Our study

Research target

Data set

Analyze close call incident
reports to assess severity level

117 reports from the
ASRS (2014–2016)

Extract metadata and keywords
86,912 qualiﬁed reports
from the narratives, and topic
used from DGAC
mining
Automate the topic mining
process

ASRS incidents from
2010 to 2015 (the exact
number is not speciﬁed)

Identify the contributing factors 7,484 incident reports
of the incident reports
from the ASRS
Identify two primary causal
factors of incidents with
machine learning

168,227 incidents from
the ASRS

Identify the primary factor and
multiple contributing factors of 181,651 incident reports
each incident from six most
from the ASRS
causal factors

(1) Rather than directly addressing the task of classifying
incident reports, we make an early attempt to introduce a well-trained deep-learning language
baseline model that can “understand” general English texts, and then we reﬁne our model based on
the performance of the baseline model to cope with
the incident reports. Our research shows that about
4% accuracy is gained.

Algorithms
Bliss’s taxonomy, a
manual case-by-case
review process
N-Grams Support
Vector Machine topic
modeling

Performance
Modiﬁcation on the close call
taxonomy is needed, but results were
not discussed quantitatively
Incident reports classiﬁed to seven
major topics, with about 78% F1 score
on average
Some incidents are closely related to
N-Grams topic
key words, and topic modeling
modeling
identiﬁed those well, but results were
not evaluated quantitatively
Identify the multiple factors of each
Latent semantic analysis
incident; the accuracy needs
signiﬁcant improvement
Automate to identify two most casual
Naive Bayes Hoeﬀding
factors, and topic mining used to
tree OzaBagADWIN
extract structured information
Demonstrate that deep learning is a
powerful tool for processing complex
Deep recurrent neural
textual data. We achieve best
networks
performance so far to identify the
primary factor and contributing
factors among related research

(2) To the best of our knowledge, our study is the ﬁrst
attempt to perform a multiclass and multilabel operation on ASRS incident reports on a large scale.
Our study pushes the application of deep learning
methods in the safety management domain forward.
We propose suitable metrics to evaluate the performance of this multiclass and multilabel classiﬁcation, which is rarely used in extant research as they
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Figure 1: Annual incident reports ASRS received from 1981 to
2019.

primarily focus on binary or single-label
classiﬁcation.
(3) Our study demonstrates the high adaptability and
reusability of deep learning methods. Therefore, our
proposed deep learning methods are applicable to
many tasks that demand text analysis, especially in
an automated way. In addition, once the data is
updated or the task is changed somewhat, the developed deep learning model can be modiﬁed accordingly without starting over from scratch.
This study establishes a fruitful research foundation for
researchers who seek to apply deep learning methods to the
solution of a myriad of text analysis problems in general and
especially for those whose corpora include a customized
vocabulary of technical terms. Our proposed approach sheds
light on nontrivial optimizations to improve the baseline
model’s accuracy, as we strive to present a procedure to
develop a deep learning model to help solve the pressing
problem of aviation safety decision support.
The rest of this paper unfolds as follows. Section 2 is a
review of relevant research. In Section 3, we describe the raw
data and statistics and how to prepare them to be suitable for
the training in the next step. Section 4 brieﬂy introduces the
main steps to build a deep recurrent network model using
Python deep learning libraries and reﬁne it based on our
speciﬁc task. Section 5 epitomizes the experiments to determine hyperparameters in the model. We highlight the
critical parameters that often signiﬁcantly aﬀect the performance of deep learning models, and we introduce new
metrics to evaluate the results and compare them with related extant research. Section 6 discusses the potential implications of our research, and Section 7 presents the
conclusions and limitations of this study.

2. Related Work
2.1. Automated Incident Analysis in Safety Management.
Safety management is a continuous improvement process
that reduces hazards and prevents incidents in aviation. The
incident reporting system is a crucial part of safety management, as it collects data and evidence for decisionmaking, identiﬁes potential risks to help prevent accidents,
and provides examples to educate personnel. Extant research

primarily concentrates on text mining techniques to automate the analysis of incident reports. Therefore, extant research has attempted to apply machine learning techniques
to extract textual information. Table 2 compares this study
with extant research that used aviation incident data. Tixier
et al. [11] examined 2,200 construction incident reports by
applying a rule-based automated content analysis system.
The length of the sample reports presented in their paper was
usually less than 50 words, and they primarily manually
mapped keywords to speciﬁc incidents. Therefore, their
proposed method is not easily applicable to lengthy and
complicated narratives. Mousa et al. [12] proposed the
XGboost algorithm to classify 13,165 highway-railroad
crossing incidents and reported an accuracy of 99.11%.
However, other baseline methods, such as Decision Tree or
Random Forest, also achieve around 98.5% accuracy.
Therefore, it is likely that the incident reports they were
dealing with are naturally easy to diﬀerentiate. Shi et al. [4]
applied manual feature engineering to the ASRS data set
with Term Frequency-Inverse Document Frequency (TFIDF) and fed the features into three supervised machine
learning algorithms, Naive Bayes, Random Forest, and
Support Vector Machine (SVM), to identify the two most
frequent primary factors: “human factors” and “aircraft.”
The shortcomings of this research are that primary factors,
“human factors,” and “aircraft” combined account for about
81% of all incidents, and, even with only the two most
frequent primary factors selected, the three traditional
machine learning methods used in the research could only
achieve an average accuracy about 81% at best. Therefore, a
practical model that can handle more factors with improved
accuracy is needed. Tanguy et al. [2] built classiﬁers with
French national aviation occurrence data (DGAC1). The
authors employed manual feature engineering using
N-Grams and topic modeling and used the extracted features to train an SVM classiﬁer. Rather than attempting to
identify the primary factors from the incident reports, their
goal was to discover the main topics of the incident, such as
“cabin,” “ground,” and “weather.” The disadvantage of their
method is that, even when things like “cabin” and “weather”
are mentioned in an incident report, they are not necessarily
the actual factors that caused the incident. Robinson [13] was
one of the ﬁrst authors to tackle multilabel classiﬁcation
using an ASRS data set. The author built a latent semantic
analysis (LSA) model, trained it with 4,497 incidents, and
tested the model on 2,987 other incidents. However, the
author reported poor model performance with an average F1
score of 0.409 due to the small sample size used in the
research overly ambitious attempt to classify all factors.
Our literature review indicates research gaps existing in
the extant research. Most of the extant studies only use a
relatively small number of data samples to develop their
models. Models developed in this way may only be applicable to limited data sets. However, transportation incident
reports are usually highly unstructured. Furthermore, although Shi et al. [4] used an extensive data set in their
research, they only addressed the two most frequent factors,
human factors and aircraft, which account for about 80% of
all incidents, and ignored the rest. Such oversimpliﬁcation
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restricts the model to limited applications. The proposed
methods in extant research are subject to two signiﬁcant
shortcomings: (1) a lack of high accuracy (less than 80%) and
(2) a limited number of primary and contributing factors.
Therefore, eﬀectively automated identiﬁcation of multiple
incident factors to support decision-making remains one of
the main challenges in aviation reporting systems. Due to
various contributing factors such as human factors, aircraft,
weather, and company policy [16], the inherent complexity
of aviation operations requires reviewers with aviation experience to make sensible judgments. Accumulated evidence
of the successful application of deep learning methods to the
analysis of incident reports could bring about the acceptance
of this approach as a solution to aviation safety management.
2.2. Emerging Deep Learning Methods in Transportation.
In the last few years, deep recurrent networks, a subclass of
deep learning methods, have been widely applied in
transportation decision-making systems and have achieved
promising results. Dong et al. [17] applied deep neural
networks to predict traﬃc crashes. The study shows the
advantages of deep learning methods over SVM, including
automatic feature extraction, superior performance, and the
ability to handle heterogeneous data. Cortez et al. [18] used
bidirectional long short-term memory (LSTM) to predict
emergency events using data from the Korean Ministry of
the Interior in 2015, and the LSTM model showed better
performance than SVM and time series models. A more
recent aviation study [19] used recurrent networks to predict
ﬂight trajectory and their results illustrated the promising
performance of the blended deep learning model in predicting ﬂight trajectory and assessing en-route ﬂight safety.
Luo et al. [20] combined KNN and LSTM to predict traﬃc
ﬂow. KNN was used to address spatial data and LSTM for
temporal data. The study reported that the deep learning
method achieved superior performance on real traﬃc data.
All the above studies have successfully shown the superiority
of deep learning methods on large and unstructured data
sets over traditional machine learning algorithms.
The deep neural network model, which combines the
advantages of unsupervised and supervised learning algorithms, is superior to traditional machine learning algorithms
in many respects, especially in this “Big Data” era. Instead of the
manual feature engineering required by traditional machine
learning algorithms, deep learning methods can extract intrinsic features without human intervention. The manual
feature engineering is primarily based on word frequency
statistics [21], such as TF-IDF and N-Grams. Its main shortcoming is that it has diﬃculty in capturing the relationships
among textual data accurately. In deep neural networks, on the
other side, the word is represented as a high-dimensional
vector using a skip-gram technique [22]. In this way, intrinsic
relationships among words and the meaning of each word can
be constructed and calculated, and this approach has yielded
outstanding results [23]. Second, another advantage of deep
neural networks is that traditional machine learning methods
primarily predict by merely counting the word frequencies or
probabilities of words that appear together, rather than
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extracting the meaning of the word based on its semantic
context. However, deep neural networks have the ability to
“remember” or store previous information. This ability is
beneﬁcial for building relationships among words that do not
appear close to each other. This ability is crucial to our tasks
because incident reports may not be written in an organized
and concise way. That is one of the main reasons why the
automatic analysis of incident reports is challenging. Last, deep
neural networks are naturally suitable for use with a large
amount of textual data. More data is helpful to reﬁne the word
embeddings [24]. Word embeddings are also called word
vectors. They are a way of converting textual data o numbers.
Unlike other common ways of embedding, such as frequency
embedding, TF-IDF, Count Vectors, and word vectors are
initialized randomly, then trained, and reﬁned with a large
corpus of texts. The essence of word embedding is that all the
other words in the context decide the value of a word vector.
Mikolov et al. [25] developed this method, and it has gained
signiﬁcant attention in natural language processing since then.
With word embeddings applied, the model can evolve along
with the accumulation of incident reports, as the ASRS is
constantly receiving them.
Despite being powerful and eﬃcient type of algorithms
successfully applied to many domains, deep learning
methods have found limited implementation in transportation incident reporting systems, which require natural
language processing. The goal of this paper is to cover this
research gap by building deep recurrent neural networks
that can automate aviation incident report analysis with
better performance than extant research.

3. Data Preparation
3.1. Data Descriptive. We downloaded about 200,000 incident reports from the ASRS database ranging from January
1988 to July 2020 when accessed on October 2, 2020, yielding
a total of 181,651 qualiﬁed reports. Other unqualiﬁed reports, such as those without labels or those that are too short
(fewer than 20 words), are discarded. Every incident report is
composed of four pieces of text from two persons (their
narratives and callbacks), which we have combined as a
single narrative text sent to our model. Figure 2 shows the
distribution of the number of words and sentences in our
data sets. The considerable variations of number of words
and sentences make it more diﬃcult to build a robust model.
There are 16 primary factors identiﬁed by human experts
in aviation incidents; however, we only use incident reports
involving the six most frequent categories of human factors
(HF), aircraft (AC), company policy (CP), procedure (PR),
weather (WE), and airport (AP), which make up 95% of the
incident reports. Incidents attributed to rare factors are not
considered in this research, because they only account for a
fraction of all incidents and would need more data to
generate meaningful results. We believe that our research
thus achieves a reasonable balance in terms of performance,
feasibility, and reasonable simpliﬁcation. Table 3 lists all
primary factors and their percentages of all incidents. The
highlighted factors are used in this study and other rare
factors are ignored.
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Figure 2: Distributions of lengths of incident reports based on the number of sentences and words.
Table 3: There are sixteen primary causal factors identiﬁed by the
human experts in the database.
Primary casual factor

Count

Human factors
Aircraft
Company policy
Procedure
Weather
Airport
ATC equipment/buildings
Chart or publication
Environment, non-weather-related
Airspace structure
Equipment/tooling
Manuals
Staﬃng
MEL
Incorrect/unavailable part
Logbook entry

112,305
43,119
7,676
7,626
6,450
4,475
2,803
2,519
2,180
1,163
465
338
238
211
154
32

Percentage
in all incidents
58.6%
22.5%
4.0%
4.0%
3.4%
2.3%
1.5%
1.3%
1.1%
0.6%
0.2%
0.2%
0.1%
0.1%
0.1%
0

The distribution of causal factors is highly unbalanced. Extant research
primarily focus on the identiﬁcation of the ﬁrst two factors and ignore
others. This study addresses the six most frequent factors, which account for
as much as 95% of all incidents. Therefore, our solution is more applicable
and feasible, because it can handle more factors, and is not targeting all
factors, which causes the prediction performance to be worse due to the data
unbalance.

In this research, we use narrative texts as the input to our
model and, according to the input, our model predicts the
primary (single-label) and contributing factors (multilabel)
and compares them with the actual labels to evaluate the
model’s performance. We do not use the “Synopsis” section
of each report as an extra input, because it is not the original
content of the incident report and would make our automated text analysis less convincing.
Table 4 summarizes the essential statistics about multiple
causal factors in ASRS data sets. Factor (or label) cardinality
[26, 27] indicates that there are 1.47 factors (1 primary and
0.47 contributing factors) per report on average across all
incident reports. This is the underlying reason for our

decision to train our model to predict up to two factors for a
single incident report, as mentioned in section 2. Identifying
more than two factors for each incident report is not necessary in our research because cases of more than two factors
are rare, and it would introduce unnecessary complexity
without obvious performance gain. There are 28 distinct
causal factor sets cooccurring in all incident reports, of
which the most frequent combination is that of human
factors and aircraft.
Table 5 shows the distribution of the six most frequent
causal factors in detail. The overall occurrence of human
factors (HF) is over 26 times more than that of airport (AP).
The imbalance of the data distribution is likely to cause the
classiﬁers to be biased toward the dominant category, in this
case, human factors. Oversampling is applied to augment
rare samples to overcome this issue. The other method we
use to mitigate the bias is to apply a conﬁdence threshold to
human factors. Both are discussed in Section 5.
3.2. Data Preprocessing. We preprocess the narrative texts to
reduce complexity and make the model more robust. Initially,
the words in the report are tokenized into a list of its constituent words. Punctuation and stop words are removed in this
step as they are not useful for text analysis [28]. Stemming and
lemmatization are also applied to the input to decrease the
number of distinct words and consequently reduce the model’s
complexity. To perform stemming and lemmatization accurately, a recognized Python library, the Natural Language
Toolkit (NLTK) [29], is utilized. The ASRS extensively uses 537
acronyms for the words and phrases that frequently appear in
narratives to make raw texts concise. For example, “STOL”
stands for “Short Takeoﬀ and Landing,” and “VLF” represents
“Very Low Frequency.” These acronyms are decoded to their
full words as the word vectors of acronyms are not seen in the
pretrained word embeddings, which has been trained with the
Wikipedia corpus. In addition, there are many meaningless
words (or noise) existing in the corpus, such as “eeegl3,”
“shedcb,” and “sewart.” Thus, we remove any word that appears fewer than four times in our ASRS data sets. The study
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Table 4: Important statistics about the utilized ASRS data set.
Multilabel statistics
Number of utilized factors
Number of valid samples
Factor cardinality
Factor density
Number of distinct label sets
Most frequent label set

Value
6
172,990
1.47
0.245
28
{Human factor, aircraft}

After cleaning and preprocessing, we use the six most frequent labels from 172,990 reports. On average, every report has 1.47 labels (label density of 0.245).

Table 5: The distribution of the number of labels along with distribution of labels within each number.
Number of labels
One
Two
Three
Four
Overall

Total (%)
65.3
24.3
8.7
1.6
100

HF (%)
42.7
14.6
4.88
0.8
63.0

AC (%)
17.4
4.6
1.38
0.2
23.6

CP (%)
0.9
2.01
0.73
0.15
3.8

PR (%)
2
1.05
0.47
0.08
3.6

WE (%)
0.8
1.16
1.01
0.3
3.3

AP (%)
1.3
0.8
0.25
0.08
2.4

The data is interpreted in this way; take the highlighted number for instance; 14.6% of all incident reports are marked exactly two causal factors (labels), and
one of them is HF. It shows that HF prevails in both single and multiple labels.

[30] also used this straightforward but eﬀective method to
remove uncommon and useless words. In this way, many
uncommon words are removed, while the important information of each incident report is kept intact. After preprocessing, a total of 6,960 unique words remain from 181,651
incident reports in this study.
As shown in Table 5, the distribution of the incident
categories is highly imbalanced. Oversampling is used to
augment the original data, because removing data from
overrepresented classes, called undersampling, would not have
been conducive to our deep learning approach, as deep learning
improves with more data. Oversampling is a process that
augments the data samples of underrepresented classes by
copying them a certain number of times. In this study, incident
reports labeled “aircraft” are copied two times, and those labeled “airport” ten times, and they are put back in the training
data set. Finally, as shown in Table 6, of 181,651 incident reports, 80% are randomly picked as the training data set, 10% are
used as the validation data set, and 10% are reserved as test data
to measure model performance [31]. We apply oversampling
after splitting the data to avoid data leakage between training,
validation, and test sets. Unlike the validation data used by the
model to monitor its performance during the training process,
test data is kept isolated until the evaluation stage to guarantee
the validity of the test data sets.
In this study, we only use oversampling to augment
training data sets to identify primary factors. Regarding
contributing factors, there is no noticeable performance gain
from oversampling according to our experiments, because
contributing factors are already mixed.

4. Methodology
4.1. Analysis and Processing of Aviation Incident Reports.
The aviation incident reports are primarily free-form text
describing each incident. A few incident reports may include
some tabular data, such as the time and location, but the tabular

data is missing in most incident reports. Therefore, the incident
data has a strong temporal and spatial correlation because
natural language is sequential, as the meaning of a word depends on the words that precede or follow it. However, traditional machine learning treats data (words) independently
distributed in the context by following certain patterns that can
be found statistically. Hochreiter and Schmidhuber proposed
the ﬁrst LSTM model [32], which is an advanced form of
recurrent neural network (RNN), as it introduces “memory”
and “forget” cells. These cells can eﬀectively resolve problems
such as vanishing gradient and long-term dependence with
which RNNs struggle. This study uses an LSTM neural network
model to process word vectors and make classiﬁcations.
The overall procedure of our model is shown in
Figure 3. As mentioned in Section 1, we approach the
problem by developing models that can identify the
primary and contributing factors of the ASRS incident
reports based on deep recurrent neural networks. Speciﬁcally, we start with a general unsupervised language
model called Universal Language Model Fine-Tuning
(ULMFiT), thoroughly trained by Wikipedia articles [33].
Next, we use an inductive transfer learning technique to
reﬁne this general model on our speciﬁc ASRS data sets to
get familiar with the structure and semantics of the
narrative text in the incident reports. Inspired by [34], we
implement a universal language model based on Averaged
Stochastic Gradient Descent Weight-Dropped LSTM
(AWD-LSTM), a state-of-the-art variant of RNNs for
language modeling and text classiﬁcation tasks. The model
uses a variety of eﬀective regularization techniques that
signiﬁcantly improve the generalization performance of
vanilla LSTM recurrent neural networks. Afterward, using
supervised learning and 80% of the incident reports as
training data sets, we build and ﬁne-tune classiﬁers using
the AWD-LSTM model and additional concatenation and
feed-forward layers to predict primary and multiple
contributing factors in the textual reports.
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Table 6: The summary of the incident reports and their label distribution in the training set before and after data oversampling, as well as
validation and test sets.
Human factors (HF)
Aircraft (AC)
Company policy (CP)
Procedure (PR)
Weather (WE)
Airport (AP)
Total

Original
87356 (62.8%)
32690 (23.5%)
5335 (3.8%)
5321 (3.8%)
4979 (3.6%)
3424 (2.5%)
139105 (100%)

Train (oversampled)
87356 (25.4%)
65380 (19.0%)
53350 (15.5%)
53210 (15.4%)
49790 (14.5%)
34240 (10.0%)
343326 (100%)

Validation
10941 (64.0%)
3823 (22.4%)
635 (3.7%)
645 (3.7%)
623 (3.7%)
428 (2.4%)
17095 (100%)

Test
16145 (63.4%)
6620 (26.0%)
1047 (4.1%)
1004 (4.0%)
952 (3.7%)
643 (2.5%)
25451 (100%)

Validation and test data are maintained as imbalanced as the original training set to truly represent the data sample distribution.

Softmax

Fully connected layer

Fully connected layer

Average pooling

Fully connected layer

Maximum pooling

Concatenation layer

Aviation Safety
Reporting Systems
(ASRS) database

Projection layers

Primary and contributing factor prediction module

Human factors
Aircraft
Procedure
Weather
Company policy
Airport
Likelihood of causing factors

Maximum and
average of all the
intermediate outputs

Text preprocessing
(i) Tokenization
(ii) Stop word removal
(iii) Acronyms
(iV) Word embedding

Language modeling layers

Incident report

Word
vectors

With attention model applied, the importance of each
word in the context is calculated, and the results are used for
highlighting essential words/sentences

AWD-LSTM

AWD-LSTM

⋯

AWD-LSTM

AWD-LSTM

⋯

AWD-LSTM

AWD-LSTM

AWD-LSTM

⋯

AWD-LSTM

Embedding
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⋯

Embedding

x0
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AWD-LSTM
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Identification of primary factor:
⇒ [human factors]
Two-label classifier
Identification of contributing
factors:
⇒ [human factors, aircraft]

Natural language model

Figure 3: End-to-end diagram of the identiﬁcation of factors of incident reports. Incident reports including the narratives are downloaded
from the ASRS database. After being preprocessed, they are fed to deep neural network model which is composed of two components: (i) a
language modeling module, an input layer of embedding and three stacked layers of bidirectional AWD-LSTM recurrent neural networks;
and (ii) a prediction module, a ﬂatten layer and three fully connected layers. After processing by these two modules, a probability score is
assigned to each factor. Finally, the primary and contributing factors are predicted based on the ranking of probability scores.

We address the identiﬁcation of the primary factors
(single-label) and contributing factors (multilabel) as two
diﬀerent classiﬁcation tasks, although they share the same
architecture until the last layer. It might be tempting to use
highest and second-highest probability factors as multilabel
results, so that only one model is suﬃcient to classify
multilabel, multiclass tasks. However, the experiment from
this study shows inferior results with this approach, as the
results are likely to be biased toward dominant factors in the
data set. Instead, the training processes for single label and
multiple labels have to run separately with corresponding
truth labels. Table 3 shows a complete procedure of our
approach. After the data preprocessing stage explicitly
explained in Section 3, we apply deep neural networks on the
textual data. The major steps are explained as follows.

the quality and quantity of the data set, we ﬁrst introduce a
universal language model [35] that is pretrained with a large,
well-prepared Wikipedia text corpus, thanks to Salesforce
Research2. The beneﬁts of this approach are threefold: (1) The
pretrained open-source model is trained thoroughly. It is called
“universal” as it covers a large set of textual data, including most
of the words that appear in the incident reports. (2) The
amount of available textual data is greatly increased. Even
though we have 181,651 incident reports with a total of about
46 million words, this is still not a large enough corpus to train
a deep neural network model well. Google3 recommends a
corpus of about 0.8 billion words. (3) This approach saves
signiﬁcant computational resources. Otherwise, a supercomputer would take one month to train a well-prepared language
model, which is not feasible for most academic researchers.

4.2. The Baseline Natural Language Model. Unlike extant
research, which does not use any textual data aside from the
data used for the primary task of each study and thus restricts

4.3. Baseline Language Model Fine-Tuning. We have a wellmade baseline natural language model, but the problem is
that it seems to be unrelated to our speciﬁc task. After all, the
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incident narrative data is diﬀerent from the Wikipedia text
corpus. This is where ﬁne-tuning comes into play [36]. To
make the baseline language model suited to our speciﬁc task,
we reﬁne our universal language model using the ASRS data
set. Inspired by [34], we implement a universal language
model based on AWD-LSTM.
4.4. Prediction of Primary and Contributing Factors. As
Figure 3 shows, after the words have been processed by the
language model, they are now presented in high-dimensional vectors and fed to artiﬁcial neural networks (ANNs) to
generate the prediction. Extant research has proven ANNs to
be successful at classiﬁcation tasks [37]. Naturally, the one
having the highest probability score among the six factors
should be identiﬁed as the primary factor. However, due to
the imbalance of the sample data and the narrative texts’
intrinsic complexity, we apply novel adjustable thresholds to
“human factors” only to control the rate of false positives, as
discussed in more detail in Section 5. No threshold is applied
to other primary factors or when identifying multiple
contributing factors. In this way, we achieve a good balance
among the six most common primary factors in the overall
performance without adding too much complexity.

5. Experimental Setup and Result Discussion
As shown in Table 4, each report contains one primary
factor and an average of 1.47 contributing factors.
Therefore, we design the model to predict up to two
contributing factors for each incident report after weighing
the advantages and disadvantages of additional complexity.
In this study, two classiﬁers are developed: (i) a single-label
classiﬁer to predict the primary factor and (ii) a multilabel
classiﬁer to predict up to two contributing factors. These
two classiﬁers follow the same methodology explained in
Section 4, except that diﬀerent truth labels and label sets are
used during the training step. This is a clear example of the
adaptability and reusability of deep learning models.
Usually, only the project layers need updates when the task
is changed, while the main model remains the same. We
will discuss the details of our experimental setup and results later in this section.
5.1. Conﬁguration. In this section, we brieﬂy discuss the
conﬁguration and critical hyperparameters of our model,
that is, learning rate, batch size, hidden layer size, dropout,
and so forth. We use a grid search algorithm [38] to ﬁnd the
optimal values that lead to the highest performance on the
training set.
Both primary and contributing identiﬁcation classiﬁers
use a three-layer LSTM4 model with 1152 hidden units in the
hidden layer. We train our model on a Tesla V100-SXM2
GPU machine with 16 GB of memory. We use a batch size of
128 as optimum, based on the computing stability of the
stochastic gradient descent and memory restrictions of the
GPU machine. Each word is vectorized to 400 dimensions
using a vocabulary size of 60,000. The optimal number of
dimensions is often between 300 and 500, according to

9
industry experiments and research [39]. In this study, the
maximum length of a sequence is set to 700 words to avoid
the diminishing returns of larger networks [40]. As shown in
Figure 2, most of the incident reports have no more than 700
words; for reports having more words, all words beyond 700
are simply truncated and ignored. Thus, the input shape is
(128, 700, 400).
As mentioned in Section 4, the deep RNN language
model is based on the AWD-LSTM, which uses dropouts on
the recurrent weights for eﬀective regularization and prevents the model from overﬁtting. As a means of regularization, such dropouts can eﬀectively reduce the overﬁtting
problem [41]. In this study, the dropout values for the
embedding, input/output of every intermediate layer, the
output of the ﬁnal layer, and the hidden-to-hidden weights
(recurrent weight-dropped) are 0.25, 0.15, 0.1, and 0.2,
respectively.
To train our deep neural network’s parameters with
ASRS incident reports, we use Slanted Triangular Learning
Rate [33]. It quickly increases within the ﬁrst few hundred
iterations and then gradually decays until the epoch ends.
This dynamic learning rate enables the model to learn
quickly when the loss is high in the beginning and to
gradually reﬁne the parameters when the loss becomes
smaller5.
5.2. Retraining Eﬀect on Language Modeling and Factor
Identiﬁcation. As mentioned in Subsection 4.3, AWDLSTM, initially trained on a well-prepared wiki text corpus,
is our baseline LSTM model. It is retrained using the ASRS
data set to make it work well in this study. Such retraining is
especially useful if the text data of the target task is massive.
Figure 4 shows how the training loss, validation loss, and
prediction accuracy of the language model change during
the training epochs. Each epoch takes about 45 minutes to
complete. Initially, the training loss and validation loss are
reduced, and the accuracy gradually improves, which indicates that the model can make better predictions in each
epoch. In other words, the model is learning. After certain
epochs, in our case, after the 15th epoch, training loss
continues to decrease linearly, while validation loss and
accuracy stabilize at certain values, indicating the optimal
time to terminate training; otherwise, the model will overﬁt
on the training set, a notorious problem in deep learning
[42]. In our study, retraining the language model improves
the identiﬁcation accuracy of the primary factor by 3.6%,
consistent with the retraining gain described in the literature
[33, 43].
5.3. Evaluation Metrics. Primary factor identiﬁcation results
are normalized to prevent the results of dominant classes
from weighing too much. Therefore, in this study, percentages of true positives, false positives, and false negatives,
rather than their counts, are used to calculate the precision
and recall. Normalization puts more weight on rare classes,
and this is usually more reasonable to measure classes that
are not evenly distributed [44].
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Figure 4: Language model learning curve. Accuracy here is deﬁned
as the percentage of predicted correct next word from a given
vocabulary. Initially, the language model AWD-LSTM can achieve
an accuracy of only 0.28; after 15 epochs, the accuracy improved to
0.38, a signiﬁcant boost.

An “exact match” metric makes sense to evaluate the
performance of the primary causal factor identiﬁcation, as
there is only one primary factor for each incident report.
However, “exact match” does not work very well for evaluating the performance of multiple causal factor identiﬁcation, because “exact match” completely ignores partial
correctness. Thus, [45] introduces 11 common evaluation
metrics for multiple causal factor (multilabel) identiﬁcation.
In this paper, hamming loss, micro-F1 , and macro-F1 are
selected to measure our results, as these three are commonly
recognized and chosen in previous research [13, 46].
Hamming loss is the fraction of labels that are incorrectly
predicted. Unlike “exact match,” hamming loss is more
forgiving in that it penalizes only the individual labels that
do not match the truth labels [47]. Hamming loss is a loss
function; thus the lower, the better.
Besides the hamming-loss metric, macro-F1 and microF1 are two conventional methods to evaluate the performance of multiple causal factor identiﬁcation [48]. The
critical distinction between macro-F1 and micro-F1 is that
macro is an average per category, while micro is an average
per sample point. These metrics are computed according to
the following equations:
1 m l
 h ≠ yij ,
ml i�1 j�1 ij

(1)

2 m
1 l
i�1 yij hij
,
 m
l j�1 i�1 yij + m
i�1 hij

(2)

Hamming loss � −

macro F1 �

micro F1 �

2 lj�1 m
i�1 yij hij
l
m
lj�1 m
i�1 yij + j�1 i�1 hij

,

(3)

where hij is the target, yij is the prediction, m is the number
of samples, and l is the number of labels.

5.4. Primary Factor (Single-Label) Identiﬁcation Performance.
As “human factors” still account for 25.4% of all incidents after
oversampling, the classiﬁer tends to be biased toward “human
factors.” To further reduce the bias, we apply a conﬁdence
threshold to control the percentage of false positives in the
“human factors” category. For example, a conﬁdence threshold
equal to 0.55 means that the classiﬁer only labels an incident
with “human factors” if it has 55% conﬁdence or more; otherwise, the category with the second-highest conﬁdence, even it
is lower than HF, is chosen. See Table 7 for an example.
Primary factor identiﬁcation results are shown in Table 8. We apply the threshold to the “human factors” class
only to reduce the rate of its false positives because it greatly
outnumbers the other classes. Based on our experiments
with diﬀerent thresholds starting from 0.3 to 0.7 with increment of 0.05, we ﬁnd that an HF threshold of 0.55 effectively reduces the rate of HF’s false positives. Considering
that the data samples of each factor are imbalanced, we
believe that micro-F1 is a better way to assess the model’s
performance because micro-F1 is an average per sample
point (see equation (3)). As shown in Table 9, the micro-F1
scores of all classes except WE are improved (Tables 8 and 9).
5.5. Contributing Factors (Multilabel) Identiﬁcation
Performance. In this study, each incident’s contributing
factors are prepared by combining the original primary and
contributing factors (if any) of the incidents. An example is
shown in Table 10.
As mentioned in Section 5, our model is designed to
predict up to two factors for each incident report. Consequently, any prediction is deﬁnitely a mismatch for incidents
that are labeled with more than two factors. Nevertheless,
multilabel evaluation metrics consider partial match (see
equations (1)-(3) in Section 5.3). Table 11 summarizes the
multilabel performance of our model by each category and
overall performance. Our model achieves an F1 score of
0.763 by averaging four averages: micro-avg, macro-avg,
weighted-avg, and sample-avg. As shown in Table 5, “human
factors” and “aircraft” signiﬁcantly outnumber the other
four categories combined. Therefore, micro-avg, calculated
by counting true positives, false negatives, and positives
globally, is preferable for evaluating our model’s performance. Sample-avg, average based on samples, and
weighted-avg, average based on labels, are adjusted versions
of micro-avg and output similar results. On the other hand,
the macro-avg metric can be expected to generate the worst
F1 score as it treats all classes equally, totally ignoring the
number of samples in each class. Thus, it is less accurate than
the other three metrics due to data imbalance (Table 11).
5.6. Comparison of Our Results to Previous Studies. To better
understand our model’s performance, we compare our results with previous studies addressing similar tasks, as well as
with a base model without ﬁne-tuning. To make the comparison valid and convincing, we use the same data sets as
the previous studies. Because single-label and multilabel
tasks have diﬀerent evaluation metrics, we compare them
separately.
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Table 7: An example of how the “HF threshold” aﬀects the identiﬁcation result.
HF threshold
Threshold � 0
Threshold � 0.55

HF
0.42
0.42

AC
0.37
0.37

Probability of each factor
CP
PR
0.09
0.03
0.09
0.03

WE
0.03
0.03

AP
0.06
0.06

Identiﬁcation
HF
AC

If an HF threshold is speciﬁed, HF will only be identiﬁed when its probability exceeds the speciﬁed value; otherwise, the factor with the second-highest
conﬁdence is chosen. In this way, the bias toward the dominant factors is well compensated by tuning the threshold. Threshold � 0 (no threshold).
Threshold � 0.55.

Table 8: Comparison of the confusion matrix of the single label with and without the threshold (orthogonal values highlighted).
Predicted label
Threshold � 0
HF
AC
PR
WE
CP
AP
HF
0.92
0.05
0.01
0.01
0.01
0.01
AC
0.16
0.82
0
0.01
0.01
0
PR
0.57
0.05
0.33
0.02
0.03
0
Truth label
WE
0.33
0.07
0.01
0.59
0.01
0
CP
0.51
0.13
0.03
0.02
0.31
0
AP
0.51
0.07
0
0.02
0.04
0.35
Threshold � 0.55
HF
0.84
0.07
0.03
0.02
0.02
0.02
AC
0.08
0.89
0.01
0.01
0.01
0.01
PR
0.37
0.09
0.47
0.02
0.03
0.02
Truth label
WE
0.30
0.05
0.03
0.59
0.01
0.02
CP
0.32
0.16
0.04
0.02
0.42
0.04
AP
0.34
0.08
0.02
0.03
0.05
0.47
By applying a proper threshold, the model’s ability to identify other rarer classes is signiﬁcantly improved, and overall performance of HF is improved as well.

Table 9: After applying the threshold, the model’s overall performance in terms of micro-F1 score is improved, especially for rarer factors, as
precision and recall become more balanced.
Probability threshold � 0
Precision
Recall
Micro-F1
HF
AC
CP
PR
WE
AP

0.306
0.689
0.756
0.868
0.882
0.971

0.92
0.82
0.31
0.33
0.59
0.35

Probability threshold � 0.55
Precision
Recall
Micro-F1

0.502
0.748
0.440
0.478
0.706
0.514

0.373
0.664
0.778
0.783
0.855
0.83

0.84
0.89
0.42
0.47
0.59
0.47

0.516
0.761
0.545
0.588
0.702
0.596

F1 score improvement
Percentage
+2.7%
+1.7%
+23.9%
+23.0%
− 0.5%
+16.0%

Table 10: An example of how multiple labels are prepared for each incident report using one-hot encoding.
HF
✓

AC
—

PR
—

WE
—

CP
✓

AP
—

Truth label
1 0 0 0 1 0

1 indicates that a factor is present, and 0 indicates that a factor is absent. Matches and mismatches of multiple labels prepared in this way can be conveniently
evaluated by the Python scikit-learn library [49].

Table 12 clearly shows that our model is superior to Shi
et al.’s [4] in terms of label categories and model accuracy.
We not only identify the six most common causal factors but
also expand our model to address multiple causal factors. In
addition, our HF accuracy is signiﬁcantly better, while AC
accuracy is equivalent. With the improved HF accuracy, the
overall accuracy is improved signiﬁcantly, as it is the most
frequent class. Robinson’s research [13] is the most closely
related study we can ﬁnd in terms of multilabel classiﬁcation.
He implements a latent semantic analysis algorithm to
classify all 16 classes for only 4,497 incident reports,

compared with our 138,392 reports for training. As mentioned in Section 1, the ten rarest classes account for less
than 5% of total incident reports. Therefore, his research
attempts to classify 16 classes with such little data are not
very reasonable, and the result is inferior to ours. In addition, the advantages of the ﬁne-tuned language model are
also demonstrated, because it reﬁnes the word embeddings
with the target data set. Table 12 indicates that the LSTM
with the ﬁne-tuned language model outperforms the one
without ﬁne-tuning by 3.3% on HF accuracy and 1.9% on
AC accuracy in single-label classiﬁcation. In multilabel
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Table 11: A summary of our model’s performance in identiﬁcation of multiple causal factors.
Precision
0.88
0.87
0.70
0.71
0.65
0.68
0.84
0.75
0.82
0.88

HF
AC
PR
WE
CP
AP
Micro-avg
Macro-avg
Weighted-avg
Sample-avg
Hamming loss � 0.091

F1 score
0.90
0.85
0.56
0.53
0.47
0.50
0.80
0.63
0.79
0.83

Recall
0.93
0.83
0.46
0.43
0.37
0.39
0.77
0.57
0.77
0.84

Table 12: A performance comparison of our method with previous research, regarding single-label and multilabel identiﬁcation.
Algorithm

HF accuracy

Naive Bayes
Hoeﬀding tree
OzaBagADWIN
LSTM without ﬁne-tuned
language model
LSTM with ﬁne-tuned language
model

73.2%
74.9%
76.5%

AC
accuracy
81.1%
87.0%
88.3%

84.8%

85.1%

88.1%

87.0%

Algorithm

Hamming
loss

F1 score

Remark

Robinson
[13]

Latent semantic analysis

0.269

0.409

Impractically targeting 16 factors

0.135

0.628

Our study

LSTM without ﬁne-tuned
language model
LSTM with the ﬁne-tuned
language model

0.091

0.763

Studies
Shi et al. [4]

Our study

Studies

Remark
This study targets HF and AC only
Our study achieves a better result regarding HF and can
identify four more factors

Our study feasibly targets the six most frequent factors with
promising results achieved

The advantage of the deep learning methods over traditional machine learning methods is clearly shown.

classiﬁcation, the LSTM with the ﬁne-tuned language model
has a lower hamming loss but higher F1 score compared with
the base model. To sum up, these results demonstrate that
the use of a ﬁne-tuned language model can improve classiﬁcation accuracy.

6. Implications
We build two classiﬁers to identify the primary and contributing factors, using a deep recurrent network algorithm.
These models are trained with the narrative texts of ASRS
incident reports. With our classiﬁcation models, the amount
of incident report analysis done by human experts can be
signiﬁcantly reduced. When an incident report is generated,
our ﬁrst classiﬁer identiﬁes the primary factor and then
properly indexes it into the database. Then, the second
classiﬁer identiﬁes additional contributing factors. Our
model can automate most of the tasks, and human experts
may only need to check the incidents classiﬁed with low
conﬁdence by our model. The implications of our study are
summarized in four perspectives presented below.
First, from the perspective of aviation safety reviewers,
our study can help them facilitate the identiﬁcation of causal
factors. As demonstrated in Section 5, our model achieves an
average accuracy of 82% on the six most common factors

and about 89% on the two most common factors on average.
In addition, our model has achieved the best multilabel,
multiclass identiﬁcation results compared with extant research. Our study has shown that this approach can identify
causal factors for 95% of incident reports in the database
with little human intervention. If they adopt our approach,
aviation incident reporting systems can quickly issue initial
results to relevant parties, such as air traﬃc controllers,
airline companies, and airport authorities.
Second, incident reports that are identiﬁed with high
conﬁdence by our models do not require review by safety
experts. Less than 4.7% of incident reports are predicted with
low conﬁdence (probability threshold ≤ 0.55). Safety experts may only need to review those incident reports to make
sure causal factors are correctly identiﬁed. Figure 5 is an
example of an incident report parsed by our model with an
attention mechanism applied [50]. The attention mechanism
is an algorithm to calculate each word and sentence’s relative
importance based on the required outputs. For instance, if
the truth label (the output) is “aircraft,” then words and
sentences likely to be related to “aircraft” are assigned higher
importance or probability in the incident texts. As Figure 5
shows, the highlighted words and sentences are likely the
critical information associated with the true causal factors of
the incident. These highlights can help safety experts locate
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Busy session numerous over flights requiring course changes to avoid traffic. Six or seven arrivals to different airports
descending through over flights and several departures. Satellite propeller arrival was coming in from the north at 10000
and an over flight was off the departure end NE bound at 11000 two F16 south departed routed north climbing to 15000
a military intercept was squawking 7777. I assumed this was in error and I informed the lead. I turned the aircraft to 020
heading to split the other traffic and allow the climb to continue. I consciously thought about re-assigning the altitude
but after the squawking the turn and traffic issuance, I didn’t want to throw any more numbers at the pilot who would
increase the transmissions and potential confusion. I wanted to get this guy on course and off my frequency but had to
wait until he topped. The guy at 10000 made numerous other transmissions. Then looked at the F16 south and he was
climbing very fast as I was about to transmit the F16 south showed 16000 and asked intermediate fix. They were cleared
to the block. I said no, assigned altitude 15000, contact ZKC. No traffic observed, but at 560 knots aircraft can mess
things uppretty quick.

Figure 5: Example of narrative texts that have been processed by our model. With the attention mechanism application, the potential
essential sentences or words are highlighted, and they are more comfortable for human experts to review.

the deﬁnitive information faster, which substantially expedites the manual review process. At the same time, safety
experts’ correct labeling of manually reviewed incident reports can improve the model’s performance in the long run.
This model can further evolve into a text summarization
system by generating a “Synopsis” [51], which currently has
to be generated by safety experts manually. By reviewing the
“Synopsis” generated from each incident report, the number
of incidents that a human expert can handle per unit of time
is greatly increased.
Third, from the perspective of reporting systems, such
automation makes the generation of statistical reports easier.
Due to the voluntary nature of the reports submitted to
ASRS, NASA mainly uses the data as a lower-bound estimate. For example, there were 112,305 human error incident
reports submitted to the ASRS from January 1988 through
July 2020. It can be conﬁdently concluded that at least
112,305 human errors contributed to aviation incidents
during this period. Based on this lower-bound estimate,
decision-makers can determine whether a problem exists
and requires further investigation [52]. It is easy to provide
aggregated and even dynamic incident statistics once the
causal factor identiﬁcation is automated with satisfactory
performance.
Fourth, the deep learning solution developed in this
study, a very versatile technique, can be redesigned and
adapted to diﬀerent domains other than aviation. This study
has chosen the ASRS as an explicit example to show how
deep learning techniques can help safety experts process a
large quantity of textual data quickly and accurately. The
application of this technique can help aviation safety experts
ﬁnd emerging dangers and potential hazards promptly from
a large volume of incident reports. Although the incident
reports in other transportation domains might be diﬀerent
in terms of quantities, textual characteristics, report formats,
and so forth, the methodology designed in this paper can be
adapted to address those varied tasks.

advances in data storage management and Internet of Things
(IoT), eﬀective and timely utilization of these resources has
been hampered by the tremendous human eﬀort needed to
identify incident causes. This study presents models that can
automate causal factor identiﬁcation of ASRS incident reports based on deep recurrent neural networks. Our results
demonstrate that deep recurrent neural network algorithms,
trained and ﬁne-tuned with proper transfer learning techniques, are versatile enough to build classiﬁers to predict the
primary factor or multiple factors with minor modiﬁcations.
Therefore, an initial understanding of incident reports’
factors can be gained from automated incident report
analysis. Given these potential beneﬁts, this study’s promising results may encourage researchers to explore the application of deep learning algorithms to other domains, such
as autotransportation, medical facilities, information technology failure, and injury reporting, where automated text
analysis is much needed.
There are several limitations to this deep learning approach. Currently, we are only able to classify the six most
frequent categories in ASRS data sets. Ten other much rarer
categories, accounting for approximately 5% of all incident
reports, are unaddressed, primarily due to the lack of sufﬁcient sample data for training the deep learning approach.
Additional eﬀorts will be required to ﬁnd a deep learning
architecture that requires less data or to ﬁgure out eﬀective
ways to augment the limited data samples. Another limitation of our study is that we have limited our multilabel
classiﬁer to no more than two factors. However, about 9% of
incident reports have more than two labels. A more sophisticated model may further improve identiﬁcation accuracy. Finally, tabular data such as locations and time
periods are not used in the deep learning model proposed in
this study. Future studies can investigate the causal relationships between tabular data and incident factors to determine which locations or time periods are more likely to be
associated with human factor-related incidents.

7. Conclusion and Limitations

Data Availability

Incident report analysis is crucial to improve safety management in high-risk work environments. Though a large
amount of incident data is generated every day with the

The data used in this paper was collected from asrs.arc.nasa.gov/search/database.html. Researchers can request the data
from the ASRS, or they can download it from the website.
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